While this does not seem very likely, it is the only viable long-term solution to the crisis. Only the latter option has the potential to solve the dilemmas which were highlighted or created by India and Pakistan as well as by the existence of other nuclear weapons powers. India and Pakistan have made it clear that nonproliferation and disarmament are directly linked.
Unless decisive steps towards nuclear disarmament are taken, it is likely that attempts to safeguard existing arms control agreements will fail and talks on new arrangements will be blocked. The elimination of nuclear weapons is therefore the only viable option. This demands a concerted effort by all states, nuclear and non-nuclear. Towards this end, a number of steps can be taken. They will provide a solid basis to enable the Review Conference to have constructive and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation and will thus help to safeguard the NPT.
If, however, nuclear disarmament remains stuck and proliferation a real danger, the NPT is likely to finally fail.
If you scrape beneath the surface, it becomes evident that there are longer-term tensions between Russia and China. The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center's primary focus is on the potentially dangerous spread of nuclear weapons technology. Even if China maintains its undeclared moratorium on fissile material production, it is unclear if India would consent to capping its fissile stock at a level much lower than that of China. Courses offered in the past two years. NPEC and Henry Sokolski deserve credit, not just for shooting straight on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but for working behind the scenes to develop competitive strategies that meld military and diplomatic steps to deal with emerging missile threats and space satellite vulnerabilities. As some analysts have stated, a key motivation for Washington's support of the FMCT is to limit China's nuclear arsenal. Saving and wealth accumulation among the millennial generation William G.
The existence of three de-facto nuclear powers, which are not perceived as nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT , was tolerated because they did not aspire to be internationally recognized. This "coming out" of nuclear powers has confirmed that the existence of new nuclear powers can no longer be ignored. The international community was unprepared for this development and did not know how to respond. Most politicians and experts were quick to state that "business as usual" would not be possible after the developments in South Asia.
But even more than one year after the tests it is not clear what the implications for nuclear nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament are. While India and Pakistan have brought political movement into the discussions on nuclear arms control, they have made arms control more complicated at the same time. In addition, new coalitions on nuclear disarmament have formed.
The most visible one of these is the New Agenda Coalition, which was able to introduce a resolution into the UN General Assembly that gained the support of nations. All of these developments will be forgotten if the crisis in South Asia escalates into a nuclear war. This danger is very real despite the modest progress that has been made in early in the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan. The military escalation of the conflict in Kashmir has been a serious setback for hopes of improved bilateral relations. Also, the nuclear weapon programs of both countries - just like the nuclear weapon programs of every other nuclear weapon states - cost lives every day, if only because of the wasted resources.
Nevertheless, the current situation contains both risks and opportunities and some of the biggest stumbling blocks still lie ahead: What will the nuclear status of India and Pakistan be?
How can they be involved in nuclear arms control? What does this mean for the nuclear status of Israel? How can these questions be addressed in the NPT? And perhaps most importantly: How can a regional nuclear arms race and a nuclear war in South Asia be avoided? The answers to these questions will, to a large degree, be provided by India and Pakistan themselves. But the international community has an important role to play in dealing with this development.
This is especially true for the future of the NPT and nuclear non-proliferation in general: The fact that India and Pakistan have tested nuclear devices in itself does not constitute a crisis in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as neither India nor Pakistan are members of the NPT. International NGOs will have a vital role to play in this endeavor. It is obvious that there are no quick fixes to the dilemmas that India and Pakistan have created as well as to those problems that have been highlighted by Indian and Pakistani action. Neither will there be a quick reversal of India's and Pakistan's nuclear policies, nor will the other nuclear weapon states eliminate their nuclear weapons in the near future.
This study attempts to give an initial overview on the implications of India's and Pakistan's tests on international nuclear arms control. It focuses on the consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as perceived by diplomats who deal with arms control issues in a multilateral context. It summarizes political developments and nuclear weapons programs in the two South Asian nuclear weapon states. The reactions of the international community to the tests in May are analyzed by traditional groups and new coalitions that have emerged as a result of the nuclear tests.
Three scenarios describe the possible impact that these developments might have on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Finally, recommendations are given to outline possibilities for nuclear disarmament that have arisen as a result of these developments. The study is based to a large degree on a series of more than 30 background interviews with members of national delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, not all states interviewed were full members of the CD.
Because of time limitations, only the most relevant delegations were chosen, but an effort was made to gain an overview of the positions in the political and regional groupings. Conversations were open and unstructured and lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, most of them around 45 minutes. Generally, the following topics were covered: What kind of challenges do India's and Pakistan's tests pose to existing arms control and non-proliferation agreements?
What role does the international community have in dealing with the crisis? What should the nuclear status of the two countries be? What are the consequences for different arms control and non-proliferation regimes? What role can multilateral arrangements play in dealing with the situation? What impact will the developments in South Asia have on existing positions in arms control and disarmament?
What further steps to deal with the crisis can be envisaged? Most of the interviews took place between the middle of June and the middle of July The majority of interview partners were the respective ambassadors. All interviews were conducted "off-the-record". Many of the positions and arguments are only implicitly contained in the text of the report, without attribution to any specific interview to avoid identification of specific persons or delegations. I hope that most interview partners nevertheless find their arguments represented fairly in this study.
During the period in which I interviewed diplomats, most delegations were still in the process of formulating policies. Nevertheless, the discussions generally took place in a very open atmosphere. Despite the busy Geneva schedule, almost everybody who was asked for an appointment volunteered time.
A first draft of this study was distributed to all those interviewed in October to allow for feedback. Special thanks go to a number of people at the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security who were deeply involved in the writing of this report: Gerd Busmann, Otfried Nassauer, and Henrietta Wilson.
Many people have reviewed the first draft and given useful advice for which I am very thankful. Of course all remaining errors are my own. The challenge posed by the existence of two new declared nuclear weapon states to existing arrangements is too big to pretend that nothing has happened. The nuclear tests have happened at a time when nuclear disarmament was at a crossroads. Coincidence or not, only three days before India detonated its first nuclear device since , the NPT PrepCom had ended in a complete political deadlock. Maybe not so much the nuclear explosions of May 11, , but the Indian declarations that India is a nuclear weapon state made clear that the emergence of new nuclear powers is a certainty that has to be dealt with.
Since then, it has become clear that the nuclear tests have aggravated the crisis in nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the developments in South Asia might still have some positive impact on nuclear arms control. International nuclear arms control needs some fresh impetus. Prior to the tests, the NPT Review Process had degenerating into a diplomatic exercise with no real meaning for nuclear disarmament.
For more than three years the CD had been unable to agree on a new set of negotiations. The bilateral US-Russian nuclear arms control dialogue was stuck, multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament were nowhere in sight. The tests by India and Pakistan have complicated nuclear arms control and will continue to have an impact on all these issues and negotiating fora. But not all the consequences are negative and some important changes have occurred already: Negotiations on a Fissile Material Treaty had commenced at the CD for a short period in , and both India and Pakistan have moved closer to the CTBT.
Indirectly, India and Pakistan have pushed for a decision on the future role of nuclear weapons in international security. This push came at a time when the five declared nuclear weapon states were starting to consolidate their nuclear arsenals after the initial rounds of numerical reductions in the wake of the end of the Cold War. In Russia, a revival of nuclear weapons is still possible, because they are considered by some as "cheap" alternatives to conventional defense and symbols of great power status.
In the US, those who are in favor of a role for nuclear weapons in countering the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are gaining ground. It is uncertain what influence the Indian and Pakistani test will have on the nuclear weapons policies of these states. But it is hard to imagine that the role of nuclear weapons will remain unaffected by these developments.
In the long run, the choice is simple: The old nuclear weapon states "can turn around and welcome India and Pakistan into the club" as somebody described it, thinking that they are "cleaning up the leftovers of a sloppy NPT". Or they will have to go down the road of elimination of nuclear weapons. Why did India and Pakistan decide to become declared nuclear weapon states?
The answer to this question has important implications for dealing with the new declared nuclear powers. Nuclear policies are always a mix of domestic factors and national security considerations. India and Pakistan both cite national security reasons for going nuclear. In both countries, however, strong domestic forces support nuclear weapons programs as well. New Delhi and Islamabad strongly criticize the NPT as discriminatory and favor a universal and non-discriminatory non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Given the relative weakness of both governments and their strong positions on nuclear disarmament, it is very unlikely that either country will reverse its nuclear policy unless substantive steps are taken towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.
India justifies its nuclear tests by pointing first at the lack of willingness "on part of the nuclear weapon states to take decisive and irreversible steps in moving towards a nuclear-weapon-free world". India has always criticized the NPT as discriminatory because it differentiates between five nuclear weapon states and the rest of the world that is not allowed to possess these weapons.